Agricultural and Food Trade in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Assessing the impact of Alternative Trade Arrangements by Philippidis, George et al.
1 | P a g e  
 
Paper presented at the 155th EAAE Seminar ‘European Agriculture towards 2030 Perspectives for further 
East-West Integration’ , 19-21 September, Kiev, Ukraine. Theme: Policies and East-West Integration 
 
Agricultural and Food Trade in the Commonwealth of Independent  
States: Assessing the impact of Alternative Trade Arrangements  
George Philippidis, Siemen van Berkum, Andrzej Tabeau, Monika Verma 
LEI Wageningen UR 
 
e-mails: george.philippidis@wur.nl, siemen.vanberkum@wur.nl, andrzej.tabeau@wur.nl, 
monika.verma@wur.nl 
Keywords: trade policies, DCFTA, EEU, CGE simulation, NTMs 
1. Introduction 
 
In the context of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
1
, the European Union (EU) seeks 
to intensify its trade and investment relations with its eastern neighbours. One of the main 
goals of this policy is to achieve regulatory convergence beyond its new borders (Commission 
of EC, 2004). More specifically, the adoption of the EU acquis and market rules is a key 
element of an Association Agreement (AA) the EU offers its neighbours under the ENP, 
whilst the specifics of bilateral trade arrangements within the AA to encompass not only tariff 
liberalisation, but also non-tariff measures (NTM) and trade regulatory harmonisation, are 
dealt with under the auspices of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).  
In 2012, political tension arose between the EU and Russia in the wake of the Ukraine 
government’s AA with the EU in the first half of the year, whilst relations hit a low as the 
Ukraine fell into a political crisis. By the Summer of 2014, increasing strains between the EU 
and Russia culminated in the imposition of trade sanctions by Russia on imports of EU food 
products, which are still in place to this day, whilst the ongoing Ukrainian crisis continues to 
cast a shadow over East-West integration. As a counterweight to the EU’s ENP, on the first of 
January 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus ratified the Eurasia Economic Union (EEU); a 
customs union with the aim of extending regional market integration to both current and 
former signatory members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
2
. At the current 
time, the EEU also includes Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.  
                                                 
1
 The ENP framework is proposed to EU’s 16’s closest neighbours in the east and the south of the Union, 
regionally divided into the Eastern Partnership and a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED). The Eastern 
Partnership includes the countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.  
2
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established in December 1991, is a regional organization whose 
participating countries are former Soviet Republics, formed during the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ukraine 
(since March 2014) and Georgia (since 2008) are no CIS member anymore, yet for the sake of simplicity we 
keep the indication ‘CIS’ for all 8 countries we are talking about in this paper. 
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With an increasing complexity of trade arrangements characterising economic relations 
between Eastern and Western Europe, the aim of the current paper is to quantify the potential 
medium term trade effects of the current trade agreements, with a specific focus on 
agricultural and food trade. In addition, three alternate trade futures between the CIS and EU 
are implemented and compared with a carefully designed ‘business as usual’ baseline. With 
an unparalleled level of global coverage, a useful starting point for any regional trade impact 
analysis is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. As a principal tool of 
analysis, an advanced neoclassical multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
variant is employed. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
data and model framework, section 3 describes the implementation of the scenarios. Section 4 
presents the results whilst section 5 concludes. 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
In its latest incarnation, release 9 of the GTAP data (Narayanan, et al., 2015) provides 
information on  cost and demand structures, supplemented by gross bilateral data on trade 
flows, transport costs, and trade protection for 57 activities in 140 regions, for three discrete 
time periods (i.e., 2004, 2007, 2011). Given the purpose of this study, the 2007 benchmark 
year is favoured due to the availability of detailed observations of first and second pillar 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments data taken from the CATS (Clearance Audit 
Trail System) database of the European Commission (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015).
3
 This 
data source was also employed to implement a CAP baseline for the time periods in this study 
(see section 3.2 below).    
To enhance the credibility of the analysis, a detailed update of the 2007 GTAP benchmark is 
required which takes account of subsequent change in trade patterns and trade policy.  Trade 
protection data from release 9 of the GTAP database for the year 2011 is employed to update 
the applied tariff rates, whilst a time series of bilateral trade flows at GTAP commodity and 
regional concordance to 2013 is also available.. To capture the recent agri-food trade bans 
imposed by the Russian Federation secondary data observations of cost insurance freight 
(c.i.f.) import values by thousand US dollars (real prices) for the years 2007 and 2014 (the 
latest available) from the COMTRADE (2015) database were aggregated to GTAP 
concordance. As the COMTRADE data only covers the period up to September 2014, it is 
expected to reflect Russian import patterns after the cattle meat ban on Canadian and US 
exports (early 2014), as well as the African swine fever ban on EU pig meat exports (February 
2014), although it does not capture the full implications of the political ban imposed on a 
number of agri-food products from the EU, Australia, Canada, Norway and the USA (August 
2014).
4
 As a result, further adjustments to the data were made using estimates of the 
proportion of EU, Australian, Canadian and US exports in 2014 affected by the ban 
                                                 
3
 The EU domestic agricultural support structure for the 2007 database is recalibrated following the procedure 
outlined in Malcolm (1998).   
4
 Namely, fruits and vegetables, fish, cattle meat, pork and poultry meat and dairy.  
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(Boulanger et al., 2016). The modelling required to implement these updates is discussed in 
section 3.2. 
 
2.2 Model framework 
This study uses a neoclassical multi-region CGE model known as MAGNET (Modular 
Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (Woltjer et al., 2014). The model employs constrained 
optimisation to characterise agent’s behaviour (i.e., intermediate-, final- and investment 
demands), whilst the assumptions of homothetic separability and consistent aggregation 
permit a parsimonious ‘nested’ representation of flexible behaviour on the part of economic 
agents. Producers are assumed to operate under conditions of perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale, whilst a series of market clearing and accounting equations ensure that for a 
given economy, all markets clear and income, expenditure and output are equal. It is assumed 
that savings rates are a fixed share of changes in regional income, whilst investment to each 
region is allocated as a function of relative changes in regional rates of return. A neoclassical 
closure rule is assumed such that imbalances on the capital account (i.e., regional savings less 
investment) are compensated by the current account (exports minus imports), such that the 
balance of payments nets to zero.  
Given its modular structure, the MAGNET model allows the user to switch on and off 
specific modules, subject to the requirements of the study at hand. Thus, for the current study, 
the model includes a detailed land supply module based on bio-physical data from IMAGE 
(Eickhout et al., 2009); explicit CAP modelling consisting of a representation of agricultural 
factor market rigidities, first pillar (decoupled and coupled) and second pillar payments 
(including productivity effects), production quotas on raw milk and sugar, and a detailed CAP 
budget module.  Finally, a biofuel module is included to impose mandated blending limits 
which, it is assumed, are financed by taxes paid by final users of blended fuels.
5
 
3. Scenario Design 
3.1 Aggregation 
Table 1 details the regional disaggregation employed in this study. At the outset, eight 
available CIS countries from the GTAP database are separated, along with a ‘rest of the CIS’ 
composite region. The EU is split into five geographical blocs, whilst large ‘players’ on world 
agri-food markets are also included (see Table 1). A ‘rest of the World’ region captures all 
residual trade and production flows.   
Figure 1 depicts the commodity aggregation. Again the focus being on agricultural and food 
trade, all non-agricultural traded commodities are broadly grouped together as non-
agricultural; while a distinction is made for agricultural products as primary crop products, 
primary animal products, and processed products (see Figure 1).   
                                                 
5
 A full discussion of these modules is provided in Woltjer et al., (2014), whilst the implementation of the CAP 
follows Boulanger and Philippidis (2015). 
4 | P a g e  
 
Table 1: Regional Aggregation
6
 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(CIS) 
European Union (EU) America and 
Oceania 
(AMOC) 
Brazil-
India-
China 
(BIC) 
Rest of the 
World 
(ROW) 
Russian-Federation 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Belarus 
 
Ukraine 
 
Armenia 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Georgia 
 
Moldova 
 
CIS: Kyrgyzstan, Rest of 
former Soviet Union 
European Midwest (EMW):  
Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands 
 
European North (ENO): 
Denmark, Finland, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden 
 
European Central and East 
(ECE): 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
European Baltic (EBA): Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia 
 
European South (ESO): Cyprus, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal 
United States of 
Americas and 
Canada 
 
Australia 
 
New-Zealand 
 
Rest of 
Americas 
  
Rest of Oceania 
Brazil 
 
India 
 
China 
Japan 
 
Korea 
 
Rest of Asia 
 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
 
Turkey 
 
Africa 
 
Rest of the 
World 
 
 
Figure 1: Commodity classification 
                                                 
6
 Standard font defines those regions which are explicitly disaggregated from the GTAP database. Italic font 
denominates aggregated GTAP regions within a regional composite. 
All Traded Goods 
Non-Agricultural Agriculrural 
Primary 
Products 
Crops 
Paddy 
Wheat 
Other grain 
 Oilseeds  
Sugar crops  
Veg, fruits & nuts 
Other crops 
Animals 
Ruminents 
Pig and poultry 
Raw milk 
Processed 
Products 
Cattle Meat 
Other Meat 
Dairy  
Sugar  
Processed rice 
 Veg. Oil  
Other Food 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 
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3.2 Baseline Scenario Design 
Taking the recalibrated 2007 GTAP benchmark data as a starting point, the world economy is 
projected over three discrete time periods: 2007-2015; 2015-2020 and 2020-2030. The 2015-
2020 period is broadly consistent with EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework period 2014-
2020, whilst the end point of this period also coincides with the conclusion of the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) which aims to help finance the EU’s policy towards its 
Neighbourhood countries in the East and the South of Europe. 
A full description of the relevant economic, demographic, productivity and policy shocks is 
provided in Table 2. In the current research project, the baseline or ‘business as usual’ (BaU) 
scenario borrows estimates of developments in real GDP growth and population trends from 
AGMEMOD (Chantreuil at al., 2012) and shared socio-economic pathway 2 (SSP2) (von 
Lampe et al., 2014), which reflects a status quo vision of the world. Annual rates of 
population and real growth consistent are compounded and implemented into MAGNET, 
whilst labour projections are assumed to follow regional population trends, capital 
endowment growth rates
7
 are assumed equal to regional macro growth forecasts (i.e., fixed 
medium to long-run capital-output ratio) and natural resources are assumed to grow at one 
quarter the rate of the change in the capital stock. Further projections shocks are implemented 
to simulate changes in energy prices taken from World Bank Commodity Markets website
8
. 
In addition to the projections shocks, additional policy shocks are implemented into our 
baseline to capture the most pertinent historical and expected policy developments over the 
time horizon of the simulation. Furthermore, as part of the ongoing work in MAGNET to 
develop a credible Common Agricultural Policy baseline (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015), a 
full set of CAP baseline shocks are implemented for the periods 2007-2015 and 2015 to 2020. 
Using CATS data of actual expenditures up to 2011 and planned expenditures to 2020 
(European Commission, 2013), these CAP baseline shocks contemplate the split between first 
and second pillar payments; coupled and decoupled first pillar payments; and different types 
of second pillar payment schemes, CAP Health Check changes in the milk quota (2008), and 
EU milk (2015) and sugar (2017) quota abolition. In addition, first generation biofuels 
blending rates are imposed. The historical data for 2014 from World Energy Council
9
 website 
are taken as a proxy for 2015.  For 2020, 7% biofuel target for the EU is assumed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 In three regions with negative savings (UKR, MDA and GEO) capital endowments are endogenous and 
exogenous investments changes are equal to macro growth forecasts. 
8 http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets. For 2007-2015 historical period, World Bank 
Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet) have been used (Updated on February 04, 2016). For projections,  
World Bank Commodities Price Forecast (constant US dollars) have been used (Released: January 20, 2016) 
9
 https://www.wec-indicators.enerdata.eu/share-of-biofuels.html 
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Table 2: Baseline Assumptions 
Macroeconomic and demographic assumptions 
Population and GDP development in EU and CIS countries/regions from AGMEMOD projections (Chantreuil at 
al., 2012), shown below 
 
GDP, volume (% change) (2015-2030) Population (% change) (2015-2030) 
EU 32.5 1.58 
DCFTA 70.9 -10.56 
EEU 29.1 -1.64 
ROCIS 104.9 10.72 
 
Population and GDP development in remaining countries/regions taken from Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2 
(SSP2) (von Lampe et al., 2014).  
Fossil fuel prices assumptions 
World Fossil fuel price changes for energy and oil sectors (%): 
2007-2015: energy (-37.15) ; oil (-35.54) 
2015-2020: energy (-8.7); oil (6.7) 
2020-2030: energy (10.5); oil (29.5) 
Policy assumptions 
2007-2015 
Agricultural Policy (including 2008 Health Check reforms) 
• Phasing in of decoupled payments for 2004 and 2007 accession members 
• Targeted removal of specific pillar 1 coupled support payments: Arable crops, olives and hops to be fully 
decoupled from 2010; Seeds, beef and veal payments (except the suckler cow premium) decoupled by 2012, 
Protein crops, rice and nuts will be decoupled by 1 January 2012, Abolish the energy crop premium in 2010 
• Re-coupling of support under the article 68 provision: Member states may use up to 10 per cent of their 
financial ceiling to grant measures to address disadvantages for farmers in certain regions specialising in dairy, 
beef, goat and sheep meat, and rice farming 
• Pillar 2 payments to the EU27 under the financial framework  
• Abolition of the Milk quota 
• Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget 
Biofuels Policy 
• For the main first generation biofuel producers, exogenously targeted blending limits are imposed based on 
observed data from 2014 
Trade Policy 
• EU enlargement to 28 members through exogenous shocks to border support 
• Exogenous tariff shocks to update applied tariffs to 2015 (based on 2011 tariff rates) to take into account EU 
FTAs, Russian Accession to the WTO, the Everything But Arms deal 
• Trade flow shocks to capture the Russia ban, and the structure of Extra-EU and Intra-CIS trade in agri-food 
commodities. 
 
2015-2020 
Agricultural Policy 
• Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget consistent with 15.2% cut in nominal CAP 
budget reduction 
• Pillar 1 and pillar 2 nominal expenditures are cut 13% and 18%, respectively (European Council, 2013). This 
corresponds to a 15.2% cut in nominal CAP budgetary funding. 
• Greening of 30% of first pillar payments, represented as pillar two agro-environmental payments  
• Abolition of the sugar quota 
Biofuels Policy 
• Biofuel mandates of 7% for the EU by 2020 
Trade Policy 
• Applied tariff finishing shocks between South Korea and the EU27 (agreement enacted in 2010) 
• Removal of the Russian ban on agri-food imports 
 
2020-2030 
Biofuels Policy 
• Biofuels mandates for the EU as in 2020 
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In the case of trade policy, exogenous shocks are imposed on the ad valorem equivalent 
(AVE) applied tariff rates in the model. In the absence of a consistent database of AVE tariff 
rates for any subsequent years beyond 2011, it is assumed that targeted 2011 AVE’s serve as a 
proxy for the end of the first period (2015). In the case of the EU-Korea FTA signed in 2011, 
a cursory review of the agreement reveals that the tariff reductions were frontloaded in the 
year of the agreement. Without specific tariff line information for this GTAP aggregation, it is 
assumed that the 2011 AVEs already include many of these developments. In the 2015-2020 
period, all remaining AVEs between Korea and the EU are eliminated. A remaining 
consideration was that of the EBA deal between a number of Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and Afro-Caribbean Pacific (ACPs) and the EU. In principle, the EBA deal was 
implemented in 2001, with only bananas (2006), sugar (July 2009) and rice (September 2009) 
being subsequently amended. Once again, it is assumed that the 2011 AVE tariffs fully 
capture these tariff shocks. In addition to the above, the 2007-2015 tariff update shocks also 
include enlargement of the EU to Croatia whilst export subsidy rates are also eliminated on all 
EU exports.  
Further shocks for the period 2007-2015 are implemented to capture changes in the pattern of 
trade flows on agri-food products (including the Russian ban) and the extra-EU28 trade 
balance.
10
 To accomplish this, some additional behavioural elements are added to the 
Armington import demands in the CES functions of the MAGNET model. To control import 
values, we depart from the traditional ‘closure swap approach’ where an (endogenous) tariff 
adjusts to accommodate trade changes. With an array of exogenous shocks to AVE tariffs, 
this approach cannot be implemented. Moreover, in the case of banned commodities, AVE 
tariff rates would have to rise to prohibitively high levels to target exogenous reductions in 
imports. The underlying hypothesis is that tariff driven import price rises cause the fall in 
imports – which is not an accurate depiction of a ban.  
Instead, changes in trade flows are represented by adjustments to aggregate consumer utility 
in the importing region (Boulanger et al., 2016). For example, the effect of Russia's self-
imposed ban and the subsequent loss of access to preferred import trade routes, would be 
translated as a loss of utility to Russian consumers. More specifically, in log linear terms, 
equation (1) represents cost minimising bilateral (Armington) import demands for ‘i’, from 
export region ‘r’ to import region ‘s’ (qi,r,s), as a function of aggregate utility in region ‘s’ 
(ui,s), the bilateral import price (pi,r,s), the composite price per unit of utility (pi,s), the elasticity 
of substitution (i) and (exogenous) bilateral consumer utility (zi,r,s).
11
  
sriisisriisisri zppuq ,,,,,,,, ][         [1] 
The composite price (equation 2) is a trade weighted share (Si,r,s) of bilateral import prices and 
utility, as well as the (negative) elasticity parameter, i.  
                                                 
10
 An initial run of the model revealed that the EU28 agri-food trade balance remained negative in 2015, which 
does not correspond with historical data. 
11
 The derivations behind these equations are available upon request. 
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Swapping qi,r,s and zi,r,s in the model closure , one may target reductions in Russian imports 
(i.e., ‘s’ = Russia) associated with the ban by associated falls in Russian consumer bilateral 
utility, which also implies that the per unit cost of utility on banned good ‘i’, rises (equation 
[2]). In this study, subject to data availability from GTAP (see section 2.1), targeted changes 
are exogenously imposed on the bilateral value of commodity imports at cif prices rather than 
import quantities.  
It should be noted that in attempting to faithfully recreate a comprehensive picture on the 
structure of trade flows for a number of CIS and EU countries, given the accounting 
assumptions of the model and the Armington elasticities, it was not possible to target all 
values, due to negative numbers or unrealistic trade diversion outcomes in the updated 
database. As a result, multiple simulation runs were conducted until a final set of shocks were 
arrived at which produced a reasonable outcome. In addition, in the 2015-2020 period reverse 
exogenous shocks to the zxs variable on Russian import routes were imposed to simulate the 
recuperation of pre-ban Russian consumer preferences.
12
  
Finally, in the 2015-2020 and 2020-2030 periods, two trade agreements characterise increased 
trade co-operation both between the CIS members and the EU (DCFTA) as well as between 
the CIS members (EEU). The specific shocks are fully described in Table 3, where the 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are classified as DCFTA countries, and Belarus, Russia and 
Kazakhstan are EEU countries, subsequently joined by Armenia in the 2020-2030 period. In 
addition to tariff rate shocks, NTM harmonisation shocks are represented by changes in 
‘iceberg’ (Samuelson, 1952) type per-unit purchase costs within the Armington function of 
the recipient country, ‘s’. The notion is that an increase in trade facilitation through greater 
harmonisation of regulatory measures implies that for every unit of sales from export region 
‘r’ now generates higher utility in the importing region.13   
Additional trade policy shocks are incorporated to capture greater trade integration, both 
between CIS members, and between the CIS and the EU. Two trade agreements are included 
here as the DCFTA and EEU agreements. DCFTAs assume full liberalization of bilateral 
trade and a decrease of NTMs between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which are 
signatories of DCFTAs. The EEU agreement creates a customs union between Belarus, 
Russia, and Kazakhstan by 2020, whilst Armenia joins in the period 2020-2030. All external 
border support implemented by signatory members of the EEU follows the structure adopted 
by the Russian Federation. In addition, NTM trade costs between EEU members are reduced. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 In the initial database, utility from bilateral preferences is benchmarked to a value of 1 and updated by 
corresponding changes in the variable zxs. To recover pre-ban Russian preferences, reverse shocks were 
implemented to the (now) exogenous variable zxs(i,r,”RUS”), to return to the initial value of 1. 
13
 In other words, less imports are required to generate the same level of utility in import region ‘s’ 
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Table 3: Baseline assumptions shaping the DCFTA and EEU agreements 
DCFTA agreement with the EU EEU agreement 
2015-2020 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova: zero tariffs 
and subsidies (imports and exports) for all 
commodities with EU.  
 
Decrease of NTMs by 10% on all trade 
between the DCFTA and EU countries. 
 
 
 
 
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan: 
elimination of intra-bloc tariffs and 
subsidies (imports and exports), decrease 
of NTMs by 10% on all trade between the 
countries. 
 
The three establish a common external 
tariff policy and external tariffs and 
subsidies (imports and exports) for the 
EEU equal to those of Russia. 
 
2020-2030 
Decrease of NTMs by a further 25% between 
the DCFTA and EU countries on all trade. 
Armenia eliminates all border tariffs with 
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan. And the 
four see a 25% reduction in NTMs on all 
trade within the block. 
 
Armenian border tariffs with rest of the 
non-EEU world are aligned with those of 
Russia. 
 
3.3 Alternate trade scenarios 
To characterise a progressive stance with respect to increased trade co-operation, a ‘Deeper 
Integration’ (DI) scenario is designed. In practise, this scenario further reduces DCFTA-EU 
and intra EEU trade facilitation costs by ten percentage points compared with the baseline and 
introduces modernisation shocks to the DCFTA and EEU regions’ agri-food sectors through 
increases in services input efficiency. Furthermore, it is envisaged that Russia’s relations with 
the West improve, characterised by increased trade integration between the EEU and EU 
regions through trade facilitation cost and tariff cost reductions; as well as lower tariffs on 
EEU-rest of the world trade (see Table 4).  
The ‘Liberalisation’ (LB) scenario takes this vision of trade integration to a higher level, by 
envisaging a utopian vision of multilateral trade co-operation. More specifically, this scenario 
contemplates all of the trade shocks included within the Deeper Integration scenario, but 
further extends the remit of trade access to all countries in the world through tariff and NTM 
trade costs reductions (see Table 5). Finally, the ‘Trade Blocks’ (TB) scenario assumes that 
Russia takes a much more introspective approach to foreign trade policy. Thus, tariffs and 
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NTM related costs of foreign trade with the EEU customs union are raised in both periods of 
the simulation experiment between 2015 and 2030 (see Table 6). 
Table 4: Deeper Integration scenario trade policy assumptions 
DCFTA EEU WTO and other international 
agreements 
2015-2020 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova: zero 
tariffs and subsidies (imports and 
exports) for all commodities with 
EU.  
 
Decrease of NTMs by 20% between 
DCFTA and EU countries on all 
trade. 
 
A 3% increase in the efficiency of 
“services” inputs used in ag-food 
industry in DCFTA countries. 
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan: 
elimination of intra-bloc tariffs and 
subsidies (imports and exports), 
decrease of NTMs by 20% on all 
trade. 
 
The three establish a common 
external tariff policy and external 
tariffs and subsidies (imports and 
exports) for the EEU equals those 
of Russia.  
 
A 3% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in EEU countries. 
Decrease of NTMs by 10% on all 
trade between EEU and EU 
countries. 
 
Import tariffs on all traded goods, 
between EEU and EU are reduced by 
60%, and between EEU and non-EU 
countries are reduced by 50% in 
2015-2030 period. One third of this 
reduction is implemented in 2015-
2020 period.   
2020-2030 
Decrease of NTMs by 35% between 
DCFTA and EU countries on all 
trade. 
 
A 6% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in DCFTA countries 
 
Armenia eliminates all border 
tariffs with Belarus, Russia, and 
Kazakhstan. And the four see a 
35% reduction in NTMs on all 
trade within the block. 
 
Armenian border tariffs with rest 
of the non-EEU world are aligned 
with those of Russia.  
 
A 6% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in EEU countries 
Decrease of NTMs by 10% on all 
trade between EEU and EU 
countries. 
 
Import tariffs on all traded goods, 
between EEU and EU are reduced by 
60%, and between EEU and non-EU 
countries are reduced by 50% in 
2015-2030 period. Two thirds of this 
reduction is implemented in 2020-
2030 period. 
 
As Armenia joins EEU in 2020, all 
of the tariff and NTM reductions for 
Armenia-EU (60%) and Armenia-
non-EU (50%) is undertaken in 
period 2020-2030.  
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Table 5: ‘Liberalisation’ scenario trade policy assumptions 
DCFTA EEU WTO and other international 
agreements 
2015-2020 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova: zero 
tariffs and subsidies (imports and 
exports) for all commodities with 
EU.  
 
Decrease of NTMs by 20% between 
DCFTA and EU countries on all 
trade. 
 
A 3% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in DCFTA countries. 
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan: 
elimination of intra-bloc tariffs and 
subsidies (imports and exports), 
decrease of NTMs by 20% on all 
trade. 
 
The three establish a common 
external tariff policy and external 
tariffs and subsidies (imports and 
exports) for the EEU equals those 
of Russia.  
 
A 3% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in EEU countries. 
Decrease of NTMs by 7% on all 
trade between all countries. 
 
An additional 10% NTM reduction 
on all trade between EEU and EU. 
 
Import tariffs on all traded goods, 
between EEU and EU are reduced by 
60%, and between EEU and non-EU 
countries are reduced by 50% in a 
period 2015-2030. One third of this 
reduction is implemented in 2015-
2020 period.   
 
Decrease in worldwide tariffs on all 
trade for all remaining countries by 
50% in a period 2015-2030. One 
third of this reduction is 
implemented in 2015-2020 period.   
2020-2030 
Decrease of NTMs by 35% between 
DCFTA and EU countries on all 
trade. 
 
A 6% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in DCFTA countries 
 
Armenia eliminates all border 
tariffs with Belarus, Russia, and 
Kazakhstan. And the four see a 
35% reduction in NTMs on all 
trade within the block. 
 
Armenian border tariffs with rest 
of the non-EEU world are aligned 
with those of Russia.  
 
A 6% increase in efficiency in 
“services” used in ag-food industry 
in EEU countries 
Decrease of NTMs by 16% on all 
trade between all countries. 
 
An additional 10% NTM reduction 
on all trade between EEU and EU. 
 
Import tariffs on all traded goods, 
between EEU and EU are reduced by 
60%, and between EEU and non-EU 
countries are reduced by 50% in 
2015-2030 period. Two thirds of this 
reduction is implemented in 2020-
2030 period.  
 
As Armenia joins EEU in 2020, all 
of the reduction for Armenia-EU 
(60%) and Armenia-non-EU (50%) 
is undertaken in period 2020-2030.  
 
Decrease in worldwide tariffs on all 
trade for all remaining countries by 
50% in a period 2015-2030. Two 
thirds of this reduction is 
implemented in 2020-2030 period 
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Table 6: ‘Trade Blocs’ scenario trade policy assumptions 
DCFTA EEU WTO and other international 
agreements 
2015-2020 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova: zero 
tariffs and subsidies (imports and 
exports) for all commodities with 
EU.  
 
Decrease of NTMs by 10% on all 
trade between DCFTA and EU 
countries. 
 
  
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan: 
elimination of intra-bloc tariffs and 
subsidies (imports and exports), 
decrease of NTMs by 10% on all 
trade between the countries. 
 
The three establish a common 
external tariff policy and external 
tariffs and subsidies (imports and 
exports) for the EEU equals those 
of Russia.  
Increase in NTMs for all trade 
between EEU and rest of the world 
by 8% 
 
Increase in import tariffs between 
EEU and rest of the world by 50% by 
the end of year 2030. One third of 
this increase is implemented in 2015-
2020 period.   
 
2020-2030 
Decrease of NTMs by 25% between 
DCFTA and EU countries on all 
trade. 
Armenia eliminates all border 
tariffs with Belarus, Russia, and 
Kazakhstan. And the four see a 
25% reduction in NTMs on all 
trade within the block. 
 
Armenian border tariffs with rest 
of the non-EEU world are aligned 
with those of Russia.  
Increase in NTMs for all trade 
between EEU and rest of the world 
by 16% 
 
Increase in import tariffs between 
EEU and rest of the world by 50% by 
the end of year 2030. Two thirds of 
this increase is implemented in 2020-
2030 period.   
 
As Armenia joins EEU in 2020, all 
of the 50% increase in Armenia 
import tariffs for rest of the world, is 
undertaken in 2020-2030. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline 2015-2030 
Within the formatting requirements of a scientific paper, the focus is principally on the main 
agri-food activities
14
 and the three regional groupings of CIS countries. Thus, in discussing 
the baseline, CIS regions are aggregated into the signatory countries of the ‘DCFTA’ (i.e., 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova); participating members of the EEU agreement (i.e., Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Armenia) and a residual ‘RoCIS’ region (Azerbaijan, rest of CIS). To 
provide additional insight, the part-worth (or ‘subtotal’) of the model results which 
corresponds to the isolated impacts of the DCFTA and EEU trade agreements, is also 
presented.
15
 As the discussion below reveals, whilst the structural projections are dominant is 
shaping market trends (as expected), trade policy is also found to have important implications 
for those affected countries.  
                                                 
14
 Given the high degree of vertical integration in the sugar and milk industries, the upstream and downstream 
sectors have been aggregated for the purposes of the exposition. 
15
 This calculation is based on a facility known as ‘subtotals’ which is employed by the model software 
(GEMPACK). See Harrison et al. (2000) for a further discussion. 
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4.1.1 Baseline Production 
Table 7 shows the changes in production and real macro growth for the three composite CIS 
regions over the time frame 2015-2030. Under the assumptions of economy-wide productivity 
growth and an increasing labour force and capital stock, both agri-food and non agri-food 
production improve in all three CIS regions.
16
 The higher growth rate in non-food activity 
output is, in part, attributed to the real income effect. As shrinking populations are 
characteristic of many CIS countries, income per capita rises rapidly leading to falling income 
elasticities of demand for agri-food products (i.e., slower rates of demand driven growth). 
Furthermore, as capital accumulation keeps pace with very high projected growth rates in CIS 
regions (especially, DCFTA and RoCIS), more highly capital intensive manufacturing and 
services sectors benefit significantly, which draws resources (i.e., labour) away from agri-
food sectors.  
Table 7: Production volume and real market prices according to baseline 
projections (% changes) (2015-2030) 
 
 
Production volumes by CIS 
region 
Market prices by CIS region 
 
DCFTA EEUext RoCIS DCFTA EEUext RoCIS 
       
Grains 4.3 11.5 11.6 5.5 -4.5 46.9 
Oilseeds 36.0 20.4 10.3 9.5 -4.1 -2.9 
Horticulture 1.3 1.3 10.5 0.7 -7.8 53.5 
Ruminants 9.6 14.1 24.6 11.1 -0.7 233.4 
Pig and poultry 3.9 4.0 65.1 3.5 -8.0 -13.2 
Dairy -4.3 3.8 -4.6 7.6 -2.9 34.9 
Sugar 28.2 10.1 31.7 10.8 -0.5 1.6 
Cattle meat -2.0 5.7 3.5 3.6 -8.1 48.1 
Other meat -26.5 4.6 53.2 2.9 -8.1 -8.9 
veg. Oils & fats 120.8 27.9 22.9 3.7 -4.9 -3.6 
Bev. & tobacco 23.4 10.9 58.3 3.6 -6.5 -0.6 
       
AgriFood (Total) 13.8 7.9 22.0 4.5 -5.8 76.2 
    AgriFood (due to DCFTA) 8.7 -0.2 -0.1 5.8 0.0 -0.6 
    AgriFood (due to EEUext) -0.5 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 
       
NonFood (Total) 53.4 25.6 81.1 7.5 -0.4 -0.3 
    NonFood (due to DCFTA) 18.7 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.3 
    NonFood (due to EEUext) -0.5 1.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.3 
       
Macro growth (Total) 70.9 29.3 104.9 - - - 
    Macro growth (due to 
DCFTA) 20.1 0.0 -0.2 - - - 
    Macro growth (due to 
EEUext) -0.1 1.2 0.0 - - - 
                                                 
16
 Note that the larger percentage rises in the ‘RoCIS’ region are calculated from a smaller base, whilst projected 
real GDP increases for the CIS (see Table 1) over the period in the model are very high. 
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In the case of the DCFTA region, the subtotals show that in general, the DCFTA trade deal 
plays an important role in generating output growth. By and large, the elimination of border 
support and partial removal of trade facilitation costs with the EU is a key driver of output 
growth in the DCFTA region. In the agri-food sectors, with lower collective levels of tariff 
and NTM border protection compared with the EU, the DCFTA deal is expected to generate 
benefits in the majority of activities, with notably high rates of growth witnessed in the 
vegetable oils (including primary production of oilseeds) and sugar sectors. In three cases 
(i.e., grains, ruminants, other meat), the DCFTA deal has a negative impact for the DCFTA 
region. Importantly, increased trade co-operation between the DCFTA and EU regions does 
not imply significant trade diversion effects for the EEU and RoCIS regions, suggesting that 
trade integration between these three groupings of CIS regions is relatively weak. 
In the case of the EEU agreement, the establishment of a customs union has a negative impact 
of just below one percent for aggregate agri-food output in the EEU region. An explanation 
for this is the adoption of generally lower agri-food common external tariffs imposed by 
Russia.
17
 As a result, there is greater import substitution in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia 
leading to reduced agricultural and food output in many sectors. This effect is particularly 
noticeable in the other meat sector, where for example, Russian tariffs on EU trade are 
noticeable lower than Kazakhstan and Belarus. With the contraction in other meat production, 
lower purchases of upstream ‘pigs and poultry’ in the EEU leads to production falls in that 
sector. A similar line of reasoning can also be applied to explain the EEU agreement’s impact 
on dairy output in the EEU region.  
Despite the adoption of Russian export tax rates for crude oil, energy and manufacturing by 
the remaining three EEU members, non agri-food sector output is still expected to rise under 
the EEU deal. To some degree, this is attributed to resource reallocation from contracting 
agri-food activities into non agri-food sectors. Once again the trade diversion effect on 
DCFTA and RoCIS agri-food activity, arising from the EEU agreement, is found to be small. 
4.1.2 Baseline Market Prices 
Turning to the market price effects in Table 7, market prices fall in the EEU region for all 
agri-food sectors. In Russia and Belarus, assumptions of strong land productivity 
improvements depress land rental rates with the result that via price transmission, the market 
price of primary agriculture, and ultimately, agri-food commodities fall in the EEU region. In 
the RoCIS region, despite very high rates of economic growth resulting from economy-wide 
productivity improvements, market price rises in many agri-food sectors are very strong in the 
agriculture and food sectors. This is due to the rapid rise in land rents in the ‘rest of the CIS’ 
region, motivated by very high (fixed) capital-output growth rates. Thus, in those agri-food 
commodities where the ‘rest of the CIS’ produces a greater output share (e.g., ruminants, 
horticulture, milk/dairy, cattle meat, overall agri-food activity), the market price rises. By 
contrast, land rents in Azerbaijan are projected to fall (due to land productivity growth), 
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 The GTAP data reveals that there are no tariffs on trade between the four countries of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Armenia. 
15 | P a g e  
 
where in oilseeds and vegetable oils sectors (more dominated by Azerbaijan), market prices 
fall. Finally, for pigs and poultry, as a highly capital intensive activity, it is assumed that no 
land factor is employed in this sector, such that the market price fall is driven by economy-
wide productivity growth.  
4.1.3 Baseline Real Trade Balances 
The change in the ‘real’ trade balances (constant 2015 prices) are reported in Table 8 On the 
one hand, export trends are generally correlated with output changes, whilst real income 
growth increases the marginal propensity to import. In the case of the DCFTA region, there is 
a major improvement in its agri-food trade balance of $2,508 million. On a sector-by-sector 
basis, the largest proportion of this gain originates from ‘vegetables oils and fats’, ‘oilseeds’ 
and ‘grains’ sectors. On the other hand, the largest DCFTA region trade balance deteriorations 
occur in ‘milk/dairy’, ‘beverages and tobacco’, both meat sectors and ‘horticulture’. Further 
examination of the DCFTA agri-food trade balance result reveals that it is strongly driven by 
the subtotal for the DCFTA agreement ($2,847 million), much of which comes from the 
vegetable oils and fats sector. This is a result of high (and much higher than for other sectors) 
decrease of NTMs between the EU and Ukraine for this sector. For the non-food sectors in the 
DCFTA, the net trade balance deteriorates $10,864 million,
18
 despite the non-food trade 
balance improvement of $16,570 resulting from the DCFTA agreement.    
Table 8: Trade Balance volume changes per region, at 2015 world prices (million USD) 
(2015-2030) 
 
DCFTA EEUext RoCIS 
Grains 276 1233 -577 
Oilseeds 796 69 -27 
Horticulture -151 68 -2405 
Ruminants 25 -6 -2010 
Pig and poultry -9 13 -15 
Dairy -424 827 -726 
Sugar 182 227 -27 
Cattle meat -115 985 -312 
Other meat -193 212 -28 
veg. Oils & fats 2549 943 -199 
Bev. & tobacco -297 387 -377 
AgriFood (Total) 2508 8333 -8057 
    AgriFood (due to DCFTA) 2847 -65 36 
    AgriFood (due to EEUext) -83 -868 -40 
NonFood (Total) -10864 156649 36652 
    NonFood (due to DCFTA) 16570 -638 1250 
    NonFood (due to EEUext) -275 -725 -109 
 
                                                 
18
 Internal non-food consumption rises 68% in the DCFTA (not shown) compared with a corresponding 
production increase of 53% (Table 7). 
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In the EEU region, both agri-food and non agri-food trade balances exhibit strong growth over 
the 2015-2030 period. Both agri-food and non agri-food results are dominated by the trade 
balance improvements from the largest economy in this group, Russia. In Russia, with slower 
rates of projected growth (particularly in the 2015-2020 period), the current account balance 
improves as imports slow down, whilst on the Russian capital account (result not shown), 
there is a deterioration in the balance due to capital flight (investment drops) in the 2015-2020 
period. Furthermore, as noted previously, the imposition of (generally lower) Russian tariffs 
and export taxes on energy exports  by Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan  implies increasing 
imports from third countries resulting in a trade balance deterioration from the EEU deal. 
Indeed, the subtotal for the EEU deal reveals a $868 million dollar agri-food trade balance 
deterioration in the EEU region between 2015and 2030.  
Finally, rapid economic growth rates (particularly in the ‘rest of the CIS’ region) in the RoCIS 
region promote both rapid export rises (arising from output growth) and import rises (from  
rapidly rising incomes per capita). The result of these structural assumptions is that the agri-
food trade balance deteriorates $8,057 million (with particularly notable trade balance 
deteriorations in horticultural products ($2,405 million), ruminants ($2,010 million) and dairy 
($726 million)), whilst in the non-food sector the trade balance improves significantly by 
$36,652 million.  
4.1.4 Baseline Welfare 
In Table 9 are presented the welfare results for the baseline, decomposed into terms of trade 
(ToT), allocative efficiency (Alloc), endowment accumulation (Endw), technical change 
(Tech), population growth (Pop) and trade preference (Pref) effects. Under conditions of 
projected economic growth, real income rises over the fifteen year time period by $50,502 
million (DCFTA), $368,283 million (EEU) and $106,704 million (RoCIS), which in per 
capita income terms translates as a rise of 75%, 34% and 73%, respectively. 
The ToT is calculated as a money metric measure of the unit rate of exchange between 
exports and imports. In the DCFTA and EEU composite regions, terms of trade is affected by 
a mix of (i) factor price changes resulting from resource reallocation between activities which 
generate real exchange rate changes and (ii) policy changes at the border (i.e., tariff reductions 
and NTM shocks) which affect both c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices simultaneously. For the DCFTA 
region, the ToT deteriorates $5,038 million, whilst in the EEU, there is a marked 
improvement of $67,336 million. In the RoCIS, in the absence of any significant border 
policy shocks, the terms of trade improvement of $7,765 million is driven by real exchange 
rate appreciations.  
Employing tax/subsidy distortions as a proxy, allocative efficiency is a money metric measure 
of market efficiency compared with a pareto optimum (i.e., no distortion) market situation 
(Huff and Hertel, 2001). Since a tax penalises production or consumption compared with a 
pareto market, then an increase in a taxed activity or consumption generates positive 
allocative efficiency. The same logic applies in the opposite direction for subsidised activities 
or consumption. Much of this change is motivated by changes in tariff rates and trade flows. 
Indeed, under conditions of elastic import demands, tariff reductions or eliminations (price 
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effects) generate cumulative improvements in allocative efficiency owing to the larger import 
quantity effect. In all three CIS regions, increases in (taxed) imports through lower trade 
facilitation costs imply allocative efficiency gains of $11,933 million (DCFTA), $33,457 
million (EEU) and $9,160 million (RoCIS). Examining the subtotals, approximately 20% of 
the allocative efficiency gain in the DCFTA region is due to the DCFTA agreement, whilst 
25% of the allocative efficiency gain in the EEU region results from the EEU deal. 
Table 9: Welfare decomposition in the three CIS regions (baseline 2015-2030,  million 
USD) 
 
DCFTA EEUext RoCIS 
ToT (Total) -5038 67336 7765 
ToT (due to DCFTA) -2398 11 250 
ToT (due to EEUext) 28 3145 -302 
ALLOC (Total) 11933 33457 9160 
ALLOC (due to DCFTA) 2506 -105 -241 
ALLOC (due to EEUext) 73 8461 44 
ENDW (Total) 30615 227280 34062 
ENDW (due to DCFTA) 8348 -3 8 
ENDW (due to EEUext) -131 34 -6 
TECH (Total) 28432 64107 42874 
TECH (due to DCFTA) 6169 -5 -1 
TECH (due to EEUext) -1 15177 -14 
POP (Total) -15440 -24800 12843 
POP (due to DCFTA) 0 0 0 
POP (due to EEUext) 0 0 0 
PREF (Total) 0 903 0 
PREF (due to DCFTA) 0 0 0 
PREF (due to EEUext) 0 0 0 
EV TOT (Total) 50502 368283 106704 
EV TOT (due to DCFTA) 14625 -102 16 
EV TOT (due to EEUext) -31 26817 -278 
Per cap U (%) (Total) 75.28 34.04 72.93 
Per cap U (%) (due to DCFTA) 24.81 1.72 -9.66 
Per cap U (%) (due to EEUext) 11.76 2.86 -9.61 
 
As expected, with capital accumulation and a larger labour force, regional factor incomes 
increase (positive endowment effects) in all three CIS regions. The welfare increases 
associated with technical change give a money metric measure of the rightward shift of the 
economy-wide production possibility frontier (greater output potential employing the same 
inputs). In the DCFTA and EEU regions, additional real income improvements associated 
with technical change are recorded due to the reduction in bilateral trade facilitation costs, 
which grant importers in these regions additional utility through greater access to imports. 
With increases (decreases) in population, the amount of aggregate real income within the 
economy rises (falls). As a result, with projected population falls in the DCFTA and EEU 
regions, there are associated real income falls of $15,440 million and $24,800, respectively. In 
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RoCIS, where population is projected to rise, the opposite effect occurs. Finally, the trade 
preference effect measures the change in utility due to the abolition of the Russian import ban. 
With the post-ban restoration of trade preferences in Russia (2015-2020 period), the 
associated real income (utility) gain to the EEU region is $903 million.  
4.2 Trade Futures 2015-2030 
This section examines the impacts of three different trade futures (Deeper Integration (“DI”), 
Liberalisation (“LB”) and Trade Blocs (“TB”)) by comparing with the baseline scenario over 
the period 2015 to 2030. To keep the exposition within manageable proportions, results are 
presented for the entire aggregate of CIS regions and the EU aggregate region.  
4.2.1 Production and Consumption 2015-2030 
The impacts of different trade futures on production and consumption compared with the 
baseline are presented in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. Greater market access in the ‘Deeper 
Integration’ scenario through further tariff and NTM reductions benefits real growth (Table 
10) for the CIS (4.25%) and EU (0.54%) regions, where the gain for the former is larger given 
the EU’s larger partner status within the CIS region’s trade portfolio. Examining the impact 
on production by sectors (Table 10), the benefits Deeper Integration largely accrue to the CIS 
and EU regions’ non-food sectors (1.45% and 0.14%, respectively), whilst the agri-food 
sector aggregate contracts slightly (-0.19% and -0.56%, respectively). This contraction in CIS 
agri-food production is reflected most strongly in ‘other meat’ (-5.73%), ‘dairy’ (-1.89%), 
‘horticulture’ (-1.24%) and ‘grains’ (-1.18 %). Interestingly, there is a very strong relative 
production rise in ‘vegetables oils and fats’ in the CIS region of approximately 30% in both 
trade scenarios, which is largely due to significant Ukrainian and (to a lesser extent) Russian 
exports to the EU. In the EU, the largest relative production falls are observed for ‘vegetable 
oils and fats’ (-8.77%), ‘sugar’ (-1.28%) and ‘oilseeds’ (-1.03%).  
Table 10: Production volume (% change) (2015-2030) compared with the baseline 
 
CISReg CISReg CISReg EU EU EU 
 
DI LB TB DI LB TB 
Grains -1.2 -8.7 1.0 -0.4 -12.9 0.9 
Oilseeds 2.5 -21.2 7.7 -1.0 -25.0 0.5 
Horticulture -1.2 -9.0 10.7 -0.3 -16.3 0.2 
Ruminants 2.1 3.0 1.9 -0.4 -11.5 0.1 
Pig and poultry -1.0 -9.0 6.7 -0.4 -3.5 0.1 
Dairy -1.9 -9.0 4.5 -0.4 -3.2 0.2 
Sugar 0.3 -7.2 12.4 -1.3 -30.5 0.9 
Cattle meat -0.2 -8.6 6.3 -0.6 -16.5 0.2 
Other meat -5.7 -43.5 26.4 -0.4 -3.0 0.1 
Veg. oils & fats 30.3 31.7 6.3 -8.8 -30.6 1.4 
Bev. & tobacco 0.8 -2.8 6.5 -0.5 -8.0 0.2 
AgriFood -0.2 -7.3 6.2 -0.6 -9.7 0.4 
NonFood 1.5 7.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.6 -0.0 
Macro growth 4.5 22.0 -6.5 0.5 12.3 -0.5 
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A similar result to the ‘Deeper Integration’ scenario is observed when examining the impacts 
of the ‘Liberalisation’ scenario. In this particular case, since the relative macro gains to both 
regions are even more striking, given the world-wide coverage of tariff and NTM cuts, the 
magnitude of the trends on agri-food (and non-food) production in the CIS and EU regions is 
also amplified. For example, agri-food production in the CIS and EU regions falls by a 
significant 7.26% and 9.74%, respectively, compared with the baseline, with sectoral 
production falls in the CIS region as high as 43.4% (‘other meat’) and for the EU, 
approximately 30% (‘vegetable oils and fats’, ‘sugar’). 
Taken in isolation, and with few exceptions (i.e., vegetables oils and fats) the production 
results for the Deeper Integration and Liberalisation scenarios reveal a surprisingly 
pessimistic medium-term outlook for agri-food markets in the CIS and EU regions. On the 
other hand, a cursory glance at the consumption results (Table 11) for both regions reveals 
that private consumers actually benefit considerably more in both these trade scenarios, when 
compared with the baseline.  
Table 11: Private consumption volume (% change) (2015-2030) compared with the 
baseline 
 
CISReg CISReg CISReg EU EU EU 
 
DI LB TB DI LB TB 
Grains -0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Oilseeds 0.0 0.9 1.3 -0.0 0.1 0.1 
Horticulture 0.1 3.6 0.5 -0.2 -1.6 0.1 
Ruminants -0.4 7.9 -0.2 -0.1 4.8 -0.1 
Pig and poultry 0.4 1.2 -0.2 -0.2 2.6 -0.1 
Dairy 1.3 4.5 1.6 -0.3 1.0 0.1 
Sugar 0.1 2.6 -2.3 -0.1 9.9 0.0 
Cattle meat 1.0 1.5 1.9 -0.2 7.5 0.1 
Other meat 1.7 11.1 2.4 -0.3 4.9 0.1 
Veg. oils & fats 6.8 21.2 -6.5 2.7 16.4 -0.1 
Bev. & tobacco 2.7 8.1 -1.9 -0.3 -1.9 0.1 
AgriFood 1.4 5.1 0.4 -0.2 1.2 0.1 
NonFood 8.1 32.1 -12.2 0.6 18.1 -0.3 
 
This apparent contradiction between production and consumption trends can be reconciled by 
the fact that trade transactions are considerably more efficient under both these futures (i.e., 
reduced trade facilitation costs from a greater alignment of trading standards). As the trade 
costs from administration (i.e., reduced paperwork due to greater regulatory harmonisation) 
and transport (i.e., reduced delays lowers refrigeration costs, animal feed and welfare costs 
and food wastage) are lowered on each journey, a greater proportion of high quality produce 
reaches the end consumer. Furthermore, with reduced ‘leakage’ from the trading system 
requiring less production per unit of consumption, there is the added benefit that greenhouse 
gas emissions are also curbed. If the pattern of trade is reasonably symmetrical (i.e., inter-
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industry trade in both directions), then rising consumption is met by increased trade efficiency 
in both partners. On the other hand, if trade is already asymmetrical (significant exports 
supplied by a particular country or region), then the consumption needs of a large trading 
partner (i.e., EU) in addition to domestic absorption may exceed the trade efficiency gains, 
which in turn require further increases in production from that competitive exporter.
 19
   
In the ‘Trade Bloc’, the raising of trade barriers by the EEU region leads to falling real macro 
GDP growth in the CIS of -6.5%. Through reduced access to foreign trade in the EEU region, 
the resulting rise in trade costs acts as a brake on overall CIS economic growth, whilst final 
consumption costs also rise, which reduces consumer utility (see welfare discussion below). 
By unilaterally protecting EEU domestic industries, the EU faces lost export opportunities, 
leading a small relative contraction in its real GDP of 0.5%. In the CIS region, greater tariff 
protection increases relative agri-food production by 6.2%, with percentage increases in (inter 
alia) ‘other meat’ (26.4%), ‘sugar’ (12.4%) and ‘horticulture’ (10.7%). Although this also 
translates into rising private consumption of agri-food products (0.4%), it is still below the 
corresponding relative improvement registered in the ‘Deeper Integration’ and 
‘Liberalisation’ scenarios, whilst in some CIS agricultural and food sectors (e.g., ‘vegetable 
oils and fats’, ‘beverages and tobacco’, ‘sugar’) private consumption levels are below those of 
the baseline, due to heavier restrictions on trade access to the EEU region. Indeed, in the case 
of non-food sector products, CIS region consumption levels are 12.1% lower than those of the 
baseline.  
4.2.2 Market prices 2015-2030 
The relative impact on market prices for each of the trade scenarios compared with the 
baseline is shown in Table 12. In comparison with the baseline, additional reductions in NTM 
trade facilitation costs in both the Deeper Integration and Liberalisation scenarios generates 
an additional utility gain to consumers in the importing regions. With relative rises in regional 
real income, there is a demand increase for both domestic (and imported) produce, which bids 
up the returns to land, labour and capital factors. In the CIS region, the index of factor prices 
in the agri-food sectors rises in relative terms by 4.0% and 7.7% under the ‘Deep Integration’ 
and ‘Liberalisation’ scenarios, respectively (not shown). In the Liberalisation scenario, factor 
price rises are stronger because the NTM reductions are geographically more widespread, 
leading to greater real income driven demand effects. Similarly, in the EU, corresponding 
agri-food factor prices rises are 0.7% and 11.2% for the ‘Deep Integration’ and 
‘Liberalisation’ scenarios, respectively (not shown), respectively.20  
The other driver of relative changes in market prices is the reduction in the tariff rates in both 
scenarios. In the agri-food sectors where tariff protection is typically much higher (vis-à-vis 
non agri-food sector trade), the tariff reduction effect appears to dominate such that CIS and 
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 In the 2015 GTAP trade data, the Ukraine region has a very large positive trade balance with the EU in 
‘vegetable oils and fats’ and a large ‘vegetable oils and fats’ sector. In this particular case, a further simultaneous 
cut in trade costs by CIS and EU partners increases the degree of trade asymmetry in favour of the Ukraine, such 
that production rises even further in the CIS region aggregate.     
20
 In the non agri-food sectors, CIS aggregate region factor price rises compared with the baseline are 3.4% 
(Deeper Integration) and 5.8% (Liberalisation), whilst for the EU, corresponding factor price appreciations are 
0.8% (Deeper Integration) and 18.8% (Liberalisation).  
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EU region market prices more generally fall when compared with the baseline. With a 
stronger rising factor price effect in the Liberalisation scenario, the relative market price fall 
for agri-food is smaller compared with the Deep Integration scenario. 
In the Trade Bloc scenario, under the assumption of greater isolationism in the EEU region, 
the loss in real income arising from rising trade facilitation costs depresses agri-food and non 
agri-food factor prices in the CIS region by -12.7% and -13.2%, respectively (not shown). 
Overall, non agri-food market prices in the CIS region fall by -2.0%, whilst once again, the 
(rising) tariff effect prevails in the case of the agri-food sectors, leading to a weighted 2.7% 
market price rise in the CIS region. It is worth noting that in specific CIS agri-food sectors 
where tariff support is increased significantly from 2015 levels (e.g., ‘horticulture’, ‘oilseeds’, 
‘pigs and poultry’, ‘ruminants’, ‘sugar’) , market price rises are stronger. 
Table 12: Real market prices (% change) (2015-2030) compared with the baseline 
 
CISReg CISReg CISReg EU EU EU 
 
DI LB TB DI LB TB 
Grains -0.6 -1.5 3.8 -0.6 -11.0 0.8 
Oilseeds 0.8 -2.3 7.6 -1.0 -16.2 0.9 
Horticulture -1.8 -5.0 8.0 -0.1 -9.7 0.4 
Ruminants -6.9 -16.8 13.3 -0.3 -9.0 0.3 
Pig and poultry -1.5 -1.3 4.5 -0.2 -6.6 0.2 
Dairy -1.8 0.2 0.6 0.1 -2.6 -0.0 
Sugar -1.6 -6.5 10.9 0.1 -0.7 -0.1 
Cattle meat -2.4 0.6 -2.9 0.1 -2.2 -0.1 
Other meat -0.9 2.4 -1.9 0.2 -2.0 -0.1 
Veg. oils & fats -2.8 -0.9 5.0 0.4 0.4 -0.4 
Bev. & tobacco -2.7 0.1 2.8 0.1 1.0 -0.1 
AgriFood -2.2 -1.8 2.7 0.0 -2.1 0.0 
NonFood 0.5 5.8 -2.0 -0.0 3.3 -0.1 
 
4.2.3 Real Trade Balances 2015-2030 
The relative changes in the trade balances (in constant prices) for each trade scenario are 
presented in Table 13. At the margin, the relative changes compared with the baseline are 
heavily influenced by additional changes in trade facilitation costs at the border, the relative 
competitiveness of EU and CIS region border protection (i.e., tariff and NTM costs), and the 
pattern of trade between both blocs. In the Deeper Integration scenario, which focuses on 
greater trade integration between the CIS and EU regions, and the Liberalisation Scenario 
(which also includes third country market access), the trade balance appears to favour the CIS 
region (vis-à-vis the EU). For example, in the CIS region, the relative trade balances for agri-
food products improve $1,982 million (Deeper Integration) and $2,600 million 
(Liberalisation). For the CIS region, these results are heavily influenced by the trends in the 
‘vegetable oils and fats’ sector (see discussion in section 4.2.1) which undergoes matching 
trade balance improvements in both scenarios. On the other hand, CIS agri-food balances 
deteriorate strongly on ‘other meat’ and dairy’ trade, where reported CIS production falls 
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from large bases (Table 10) in both these sectors owing to rises in trade efficiency. With 
increasing real incomes in both the CIS and EU regions (see next section), the positive real 
income effect (rising marginal propensity to import) leads to an overall trade balance 
deterioration in both trade scenarios, compared with the baseline. 
Under the ‘Trade Blocs’ scenario, the raising of tariff and trade costs by the EEU region on all 
imports improves the overall CIS region trade balance. This results is driven by the price 
effect (rising import costs reduces import quantities), and the effect of falling real incomes in 
the EEU region (see next section) on the marginal propensity to import. The agri-food sector 
trade balance in the CIS deteriorates $1,118 million, with a concomitant improvement in the 
EU of $3,431 million.  
Table 13: Trade Balance volume changes at 2015 world prices (2015-2030) compared 
with the baseline 
 
CISReg CISReg CISReg EU EU EU 
 
DI LB TB DI LB TB 
Grains -191 -1,024 -1,091 92 -214 575 
Oilseeds 130 -691 34 263 1,790 -138 
Horticulture 21 490 -405 64 2,743 34 
Ruminants 0 -367 131 6 897 -24 
Pig and poultry 16 59 -24 -31 -103 -1 
Dairy -358 -825 131 -130 8,234 113 
Sugar 111 469 -119 -129 -2,590 122 
Cattle meat 98 -826 637 -214 -4,385 24 
Other meat -383 -2,426 1,499 -80 4,337 -102 
Veg. oils & fats 2,081 2,724 -47 -1,302 -3,392 177 
Bev. & tobacco -108 119 315 -312 -2,080 153 
AgriFood 1,982 2,600 -1,118 -2,557 -12,771 3,431 
NonFood -28,315 -31,102 143,550 -34,842 -1,368,380 -18,020 
 
4.2.4 Equivalent variation (EV) 2015-2030 
The welfare changes relative to the baseline are presented in Table 14. The underlying trend is 
that the change in real income in both the CIS and EU regions rises in both scenarios where 
further liberalisation occurs. For example, in comparison with the baseline, in the Deep 
Integration and Liberalisation scenarios, the CIS region gains $87,026 million and $311,173 
million, respectively, equivalent to a corresponding per capita income gain of 5.8% and 
21.2%. Similarly, with greater trade protectionism within the EEU region, per capita incomes 
in the CIS aggregate region fall by 11.7% compared with the baseline.  
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Table 14: Welfare changes (2015-2030,  million USD) compared with the baseline 
 
CISReg CISReg CISReg EU EU EU 
 
DI LB TB DI LB TB 
ToT 23,905 26,628 -54,076 1,334 238,570 17,463 
ALLOC 15,362 53,172 -25,711 24,060 231,564 -9,365 
ENDW 11,148 44,903 -15,529 7,138 152,150 -3,936 
TECH 38,441 192,052 -67,938 55,105 1,683,976 -58,604 
POP -1,877 -5,711 3,119 456 22,874 -209 
PREF 47 129 -58 0 0 0 
EVTOT 87,026 311,173 -160,193 88,093 2,329,134 -54,651 
u (%) 5.8 21.2 -11.7 0.6 15.3 -0.4 
 
As expected, at the margin, a significant share of the EV change compared with the baseline 
is attributed to policy induced changes in trade facilitation costs (Tech). In the EU, Tech 
accounts for between 63% and 72% of the total EV gain in the Deep Integration and 
Liberalisation scenarios, respectively, and over 100% of the EV loss in the Trade Bloc 
scenario. For the CIS region, tech effects also explain a large proportion of the overall EV 
change, although the share is less than the EU. This is because changes in CIS trade 
integration/protectionism policies with a larger partner such as the EU, generates bigger 
economy-wide impacts on CIS region industry output and factor prices, resulting in 
proportionally larger Alloc, ToT, Endw and Pop effects. For example, with further falls in 
trade facilitation costs, resulting real income driven rises in demand bids up factor prices 
further resulting in rising endw incomes, improvements in the terms of trade (real exchange 
rate appreciation), higher allocative efficiency (greater demand for tariffed imports) and 
steeper falls in population income (projected population falls based on larger real income 
gains).  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper employs a state of the art computable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, to quantitatively assess the impacts of 
different trade arrangements on agri-food activities within the economies of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On the one hand, a contemporary baseline 
scenario is carefully designed to accommodate key structural economic changes, whilst 
considerable efforts are made to generate a plausible set of non-tariff measure (NTM) ad 
valorem equivalents (AVEs), which in tandem with the tariff rate AVEs from GTAP, are used 
to generate changes in trade policy. A further feature of the baseline is that it accommodates 
envisaged relevant trade arrangements such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) between Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the EU, as well as the 
creation of the Eurasia Economic Union (EEU) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
subsequently extended to include Armenia. 
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As expected, in the baseline the structural supply side (productivity growth, capital and labour 
stocks) and demand side (endowment income and population) drivers typically dominate agri-
food market trends, although policy is still found to have an important impact. In particular, 
the DCFTA deal has a beneficial impact for the agri-food activities of Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. On the other hand, by adopting Russia’s generally lower common external tariff 
structure, agri-food activity in Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is found to be adversely 
affected. Interestingly, the trade diversion effects of the EEU and DCFTA deals on non-
signatory CIS regions are not found to be strong, which indicates that as a whole, the degree 
of trade integration in the CIS region is relatively low. 
Examining the impacts of different trade futures by comparing to the baseline reveals two 
clear pathways. On the one hand, in those scenarios in which greater reductions in trade 
facilitation costs are envisaged (i.e., ‘Deeper Integration’, ‘Liberalisation’), there are benefits 
for all countries involved in terms of higher real macroeconomic growth and real incomes. 
Furthermore, in the context of agri-food markets, private consumption rises above baseline 
levels, whilst reduced frictions/wastage in the trading system imply lower levels of necessary 
production to satisfy demand, higher profitability per unit of production (in terms of increased 
per unit primary factor returns) and lower emissions, due to reduced production. In the ‘Trade 
Bloc’ scenario, these above mentioned trends are reversed, owing to increased trade 
protectionism on the part of the EEU.   
Whilst the trade options explored in the current study clearly quantify the possible gains to the 
CIS region from greater trade openness, a degree of caution should be exercised. Indeed, in 
modelling the reduction in trade facilitation costs, one assumes that the necessary behind-the-
border trade harmonisation that accompanies such adjustments is costless to producers, who 
hitherto, may be operating under different trade regulations and product specifications. As a 
result, the estimates taken here should be considered as upper bound, whilst further research 
should examine a methodological approach to adapt industry cost functions to changes in the 
way trade is regulated. Finally, on examining trade competitiveness in differentiated agri-food 
markets, some consideration of product variety, scale and the process of self-selection by 
firms across domestic and export markets would provide useful additional insight to the 
analysis. A possible avenue to explore would therefore follow relatively recent applied 
developments in this arena (i.e., Melitz, 2003). 
 
6. References 
Boulanger, P. and Philippidis, G. (2015) The EU Budget Battle: Assessing the Trade and 
Welfare Impacts of CAP Budgetary Reform. Food Policy 51:119-130 
Boulanger, P., Dudu, H., Ferrari, E. and Philippidis, G. (2016) Russian Roulette at the Trade 
Table: A specific factors CGE analysis of an agri-food import ban, Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 67(2), 272-291 
Chantreuil F., Hanrahan K. F., van Leeuwen M. (Eds.), 2012. The Future of EU Agricultural 
Markets by AGMEMOD. Springer. 
25 | P a g e  
 
COMTRADE (2015) United Nations Comtrade data base http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed 
January, 2016) 
Eickhout B., Van Meijl H., Tabeau A., Stehfest E. (2009) The impact of environmental and 
climate constraints on global food supply, Hertel, T., S. Rose, R. Tol (eds.) Economic 
Analysis of Land Use in Global Climate Change Policy. Routledge. 
Harrison, W. J., Horridge, J. M., and Pearson, K. R. (2000) Decomposing Simulation Results 
with Respect to Exogenous Shocks, Computational Economics, 15(3), 227-249. 
Huff, K. and Hertel, T.W. (2001) Decomposing Welfare Changes in GTAP, GTAP Technical 
Paper no.5, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=308 
Malcolm, G. (1998) Adjusting Tax Rates in the GTAP Data Base, GTAP Technical Paper No 
12, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.  
Melitz, M. J.  (2003), “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity”, Econometrica 71(6), 1695-1725.   
Narayanan, B., Aguiar, A., and McDougall, R., 2015. Global Trade, Assistance, and 
Production: The GTAP 9 Data Base. West Lafayette, Purdue University. Available at: 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v9/v9_doco.asp 
Samuelson P.A. (1952), ‘The transfer problem and transport costs: the terms of trade when 
impediments are absent’, Economic Journal, 62, 246, 278-304. 
Von Lampe, M., Willenbockel, D., Ahammad, H., Blanc, E., Cai, Y., Calvin, K., Fujimori, S., 
Hasegawa, T., Havlik, P., Heyhoe, E., Kyle, P., Lotze-Campen, H., Mason d'Croz, D., Nelson, 
G. C., Sands, R. D., Schmitz, C., Tabeau, A., Valin, H., van der Mensbrugghe, D. and van 
Meijl, H. (2014) Why do global long-term scenarios for agriculture differ? An overview of 
the AgMIP Global Economic Model Intercomparison. Agricultural Economics, Vol. 45, pp. 
3–20. 
Woltjer G., Kuiper M., Kavallari A., van Meijl H., Powell J., Rutten M., Shutes L., Tabeau 
A., 2014. The MAGNET Model - Module Description. LEI Report 14-057, The Hague 
